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economy in the liberal age in the Western world. Within this framework, this
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role of economists in the debates that took place in the Spanish Parliament in
1869 following the bill issued by the Minister of Finance Figuerola to
establish a tax on personal incomes. Economic ideas and parliamentarian
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RESUMEN
El estudio de la influencia de las ideas econo´micas en los debates parla-
mentarios ha sido objeto de creciente atencio´n en el ana´lisis de los procesos
de institucionalizacio´n de la economı´a polı´tica en la era liberal en el mundo
occidental. Dentro de este marco, este ensayo analiza un caso particular:
La relevancia de las ideas econo´micas y el papel de los economistas en
los debates celebrados en las Cortes Constituyentes de 1869 acerca del
proyecto de impuesto sobre la renta personal del ministro de Hacienda
Figuerola. El pensamiento econo´mico y los parlamentarios economistas
jugaron un papel importante, tanto en el disen˜o del impuesto como medida
de modernizacio´n del sistema fiscal espan˜ol, como en los subsiguientes
debates en el Legislativo.
Palabras clave: economia polı´tica, parlamento, hacienda, impuesto
sobre la renta, liberalismo
1. INTRODUCTION
The process of penetration and diffusion of economic ideas in the poli-
tical realm has recently become a major research area in the field of the
institutional history of political economy. This concern is part of a broader
research trend that explores how political economy became consolidated in
the institutions and the culture of the ruling elites of the Western world in
the liberal age (the second half of the 19th century and first decades of the
20th century). These studies follow the premise that analysing the institutional
framework in which political economy develops and economists operate
provides new insights leading to a better understanding of the evolution of
economics (Coats 1993, p. 3). In this framework, the role of economists in
political institutions, particularly in national parliaments, has attracted scho-
lars’ attention, seeking to assess the influence of economic ideas in the political
debate and the design of economic policy. The performance of economists in
the political sphere is indeed considered an essential part of the process of
dissemination of economic ideas and of the institutional consolidation of
economics (Augello and Guidi 2005a, 2005b, pp. xiii-xiv).
Although the issue of the connections between economics and politics is
a core research area that has produced a substantial amount of studies,
literature on the role of economic ideas in parliamentary debates is not
plentiful. Some cases of the influence of economists and economic ideas in
the British parliament in the 19th century are known through the works by
Fetter (1975, 1980), Gordon (1976), Grampp (1987), Luzstig (1995), Harris
(1997), Gambles (1999) and Schonhardt-Bailey (2003, 2006). Recently, Italian
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scholars have developed extensive works on their national case (Augello
and Guidi 2002, 2003, 2005a, 2005b). They have also broadened their
initial geographical scope, leading an international project on economists in
parliament in the liberal age in Europe, America and Japan (Augello and
Guidi 2005a). Recently, Portuguese scholars have also shed light on their
national case: Almodovar and Cardoso (2005), Cardoso (2007) and Bastien
and Cardoso (2009). Regarding Spain, the presence of parliamentarian
economists in the liberal age was reviewed by Almenar (2005), providing
useful long-term insights into this phenomenon.
Within this institutional approach, this paper attempts to make a further
contribution to this debate through the analysis of a case study. Specifically,
I explore here the uses, relevance and influence of economic ideas in the
debates that the Spanish Parliament held on the bill issued by the Finance
Minister Laureano Figuerola in 1868, setting up a direct tax with the object
of taxing personal income. Leaving aside some early precedents, this was
the first attempt to implement an income tax in this country. I will analyse
the economic arguments behind this tax project, the ideas sustained by
supporters and detractors of the income tax, and the doctrinal influences
on both parties. A comparison between this tax and the British income tax
(a major topic in the debates) is also made. This case has some interesting
characteristics: it took place in a revolutionary period during which Parlia-
ment became the core political institution, at a time in which liberal
economic thought reached its peak in Spain. In this atmosphere, the role of
economic ideas in lawmaking was relevant1. The income tax debate turned
out to be very contentious, if compared to other discussions in Parliament
during this period.
Using as primary sources mostly parliamentary records from the general
assembly and from economic commissions, I will attempt to argue that
economic ideas did play a crucial role in the bill’s design process and in the
ensuing debates. The Members of Parliament (MPs) taking part in the dis-
cussion had a good degree of competence in political economy, always in the
framework of classical liberal doctrines. They also seemed to have extensive
knowledge of foreign fiscal experiences, particularly the British income tax,
which was regarded as a fiscal desideratum. The presence of parliamentarian
economists in the Spanish legislative body at that time was extraordinary, if
compared to the whole parliamentary era until 1922 (see Almenar 2005).
This paper is organised as follows: the first section explains the new personal
tax project; the second section explores the ensuing debates in Parliament;
the third section considers the economic ideas that influenced MPs’ lines of
reasoning in the parliamentary process and the fourth section compares the
establishment of the income tax in Britain with the Spanish attempt.
1 The importance of economic ideas in the performance of the economic team in office after the
1868 Revolution was already pointed out by Costas (1982, 1988).
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2. FIGUEROLA’S PROJECT OF A PERSONAL TAX
The September 1868 liberal revolution, which deposed Queen Isabel II,
ushered in a political period in which a newly elected Parliament was intended
to play a central role in the Spanish political process. Circumstances allowed a
group of economists belonging to the liberal school of economic thought
known as the Escuela economista to take control of the Ministry of Public
Finance. Laureano Figuerola, the founder and chief representative of
this school, was appointed Finance Minister in the provisional government
formed in October 18682. The Escuela economista is essential in our story. Its
members, very cohesive from the doctrinal standpoint and extraordinarily
committed to the diffusion of economic liberalism, were strongly influenced
by French radical liberalism3. They favoured a certain degree of doctrinarism,
and believed that liberal economic tenets were sufficient to foster economic
growth and successfully manage public finance. Their main concern was
economic freedom, particularly for trade, and they fought tenaciously for the
reduction of Spanish customs duties4. Together with Figuerola, some other
fellow economistas also entered the government, thus strengthening both its
ideological lines and its liberalisation policies5.
Figuerola’s appointment as Finance Minister granted him the opportunity
to put into practice the economic programme of the Escuela economista,
focused on the development of industrial capitalism and trade, mostly
through liberalisation measures. This programme involved policies such as
the encouragement of freedom of trade, industry, labour and credit; the
restriction of government interventionism in industry; the transformation of
indirect taxes into direct ones; the promotion of the creation of credit
institutions, etc6. Figuerola’s ultimate objective was to foster Spain’s economic
2 Figuerola has been studied by many scholars; however, we still lack a complete biography.
Recent works have been delivered by Costas (1982, 1988), Cabrillo (2000), Jane´ Sola` (2003), Roma´n
(2003), Perdices et al. (2003) and Estape´ (2006).
3 In fact, the introduction of French economic liberalism in Spain, first through J. B. Say’s
works, and later through his most radical followers (especially Bastiat, highly praised by the
economistas), marked the doctrinal evolution of Spanish political economy in the 19th century. See
Almenar (2000), Almenar and Lluch (2000) and Serrano et al. (2001).
4 The Escuela economista can be considered as the Spanish version of the Manchester School or
the French Optimistic School. They founded some journals and societies in order to diffuse their
ideas; particularly important would be the Asociacio´n para la Reforma del Arancel de Aduanas (1859),
with the aim of lobbying to reduce tariffs. Their faith in political economy as the science of gov-
ernment, as became apparent in the parliamentary debate, was exceptional (see Costas 2000 and
Roma´n 2003).
5 The members of the Escuela Rodrı´guez, Sanroma´, Bona and Ruiz Go´mez were in office and
Pastor and Gimeno Agius collaborated with Figuerola. According to Fetter (1980, p. 232), a strong
presence of economists in the government was an exception in Europe in the 19th century. The
Spanish case at that time should also be regarded as such.
6 According to Costas (1988, pp. 39-40; 1982, pp. 638-639), the main political forces behind the
Revolution agreed to it.
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growth in the long term. His strategy was a gradual reformism, which gave
priority to economic and fiscal structural reforms. This would increase public
revenues in the long term, but implied resorting to credit in the short term,
temporarily boosting public debt (Costas 1988, pp. 60-63; his decision not to
tackle the problem of the budget deficit immediately would cause him many
difficulties in Parliament). Concerning taxation, Figuerola’s main actions were
an essential reduction in customs duties, the abolition of taxes on consump-
tion and the establishment of a tax on incomes.
On October 12, 1868, the provisional government issued the decree of
suppression of consumption taxes and their replacement with a new personal
tax7. In fact, the abolition of that levy was the acknowledgement of a de facto
situation, as they had already been eradicated by the local revolutionary juntas
formed during the revolutionary process. Although Figuerola was not in favour
of consumption taxes, he was not pleased with this radical measure, as it
was against his gradualist strategy: he would surely have preferred not to
remove any fiscal revenue before having an actual replacement (Costas 1988,
pp. 79-80)8. The financial viability of the Revolution made it impossible to
dispense with any source of revenues without seeking a new one, or without
dramatically cutting expenses, as Treasury circumstances did not allow for tax
relief. Therefore, Figuerola devised a new direct personal tax, named reparti-
miento personal. It was levied on «individual wealth» through two indirect
indicators: rent paid for housing and the number of members of the household.
It was proportional, although tax relief was allowed to large families. The
allocation of the tax burden was made using taxpayers’ personal statements.
However, the procedure to calculate the eventual tax debt turned out to be
quite complex9. The participation of taxpayers was sought, in the British
fashion, both to allocate the tax burden and to supervise complaints. According
to the project of public budget for 1869-1870, its revenues should amount to
150 million reales (around 7 per cent of all public revenues, and approximately
25 per cent less than what consumption taxes had yielded the previous year).
7 Consumption taxes were set up in the tax reform of 1845. They were initially charged on wine,
beer, cider and liquors, meat, olive oil and soap. They constituted a major source of finance for local
administrations Gonza´lez de la Pen˜a (1891, pp. 268-270). See Figuerola’s 12 October decree in the
Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Constituyentes 1869-1871 – from now on DSCC – (12, Appendix).
8 Set the probable hypothesis that Figuerola was forced to accept it in order to avoid popular
riots. However, he also rejected some further reforms that the juntas had made on their own
concerning tariffs.
9 According to the project, the resulting tax bill was corrected by a factor accounting for the size
of the taxpayer’s town, in order to reflect the effect of diverse price levels. However, there was a
system of quotas that caused distortions. The government set a quota corresponding to the personal
tax to every town, which would then be distributed among local taxpayers by the town council and a
board of taxpayers. This favoured fiscal fraud, which politicians of the Revolution claimed to fight.
The actual taxpayer was the head of the family, who was responsible for the payment of the shares
of all the members of his family above 14 years of age, including servants. Local councils, much of
whose finance used to be provided by consumption taxes, were allowed to add a surcharge to the tax
fee, plus another 8 per cent for collection expenses (DSCC 12, Appendix, pp. 41-52).
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With this tax, Figuerola was attempting to tax individual income (which
he considered to be the correct indicator of the ability to pay), taking housing
expenditure as a good indicator of income. Was it his ultimate aim to
introduce the seeds of a general personal income tax in Spain?10 This would
seem to be the case. According to the tax decree and his interventions in
Parliament, Figuerola expected the personal tax to be the main instrument in
the transformation of the direct tax structure. He planned to extend it so that
it would become one of the main sources of Treasury revenues in the long
term, by gradually converting all direct taxes into the personal income tax,
making it the cornerstone of a modern liberal tax system. In Parliament,
Figuerola supported the doctrine of the single tax on incomes as the fiscal
ideal. His tax project was the instrument to achieve it: «I wish I could
influence MPs’ will, and from this moment on, turn all the Spanish land
taxation into a personal tax»11. He contended that public revenues were the
key to the economic regeneration of Spain. It was necessary to liberalise
them steadily and to introduce a tax on incomes, which would operate as a
major device to foster economic development and remove the obstacles to
economic circulation12.
Figuerola made sure that his tax was scientifically designed; that is, in line
with the principles of political economy. The tax decree underlined that the
personal tax project was «in accordance with sound financial doctrines»: it
was a direct tax, general, equitable, certain and clear (every taxpayer knew
how much he had to pay), inexpensive in its administration and collection,
easy (average tax rates were low) and flexible, as it was possible to adapt the
tax to the nation’s increases in population and wealth. Therefore, the new tax
was based on the classical liberal principles of taxation as enunciated by
Smith and J. B. Say, and reproduced by the main Spanish economists of the
century. From the doctrinal point of view, it was perfectly acceptable and
justified. By following these scientific economic principles, the decree
assured that the personal tax would result in freedom of circulation and
trade, better supplied markets and would increase national welfare13.
The doctrinal principles of personalisation and generality were particu-
larly important to Figuerola. He believed that the principle of personalisation
should become one of the milestones of the renewal of the Spanish fiscal
system14. Taxes should be personal (unlike the main Spanish direct taxes —
the land tax and the tax on industrial and trade returns — which were pro-
duct taxes), because they were essentially a reciprocal exchange for the
10 A single direct contribution was an old liberal fiscal aspiration. Mateo del Peral (1974,
pp. 15-16).
11 DSCC (23, p. 414; 105, pp. 2883-2884).
12 DSCC (105, p. 2887).
13 In opposition, former consumption taxes were «contrary to freedom, opposed to economics
and harmful to the maximum extent to public wealth» (DSCC 12, Appendix, p. 39).
14 DSCC (105, p. 2884).
JAVIER SAN-JULIA´N-ARRUPE
250 Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History
services supplied by the state to the individual, which allowed him to devote
his time to his business freely and safely. The new tax brought a noteworthy
innovation to the fiscal system as it introduced this principle of personali-
sation in a major tax15. The principle of generality, «the only sign of justice
that we can identify in consumption taxes»16, was also crucial, because it
would encourage a taxpaying culture in Spain. All individuals should pay
tributes to finance state services according to their ability and for the sake of
justice17. The principle of flexibility was another essential feature of the new
tax, as it would make it possible to overcome one of the main problems of the
Spanish product taxation system18. It was designed to be adaptable to
changes in national economic growth, which is why Figuerola expected its
yields to increase progressively19.
The example to follow was that of the British income tax. Figuerola was
convinced that his personal tax, by leading Spanish finance towards an
income tax, would be crucial for the economic prosperity of the country,
as had been the case in Britain20. Figuerola explicitly sustained that his
personal tax was directly inspired by the British income tax, the decisive
tool that had allowed a «magnificent» transformation in the public budget of
this nation, supplying the state with enough revenues without charging
taxpayers much. He also praised the British fiscal culture, which was in turn
responsible for the success of the income tax21. As previously mentioned,
Figuerola assumed that the healing of the Spanish economy depended on the
gradual transformation of public revenues. This had happened in Britain,
thanks to income tax:
«The revolutionary moment of Spain lies in a change in the system.
Public incomes have to be changed during six or eight years, because
I do not think it is possible to improvise or present a new system in
a period of two or three years. The economic revolution in Britain
15 The structure of the Spanish fiscal system was grounded on the general principle of product
taxation and complemented with some indirect taxes, following the French model. This structure
was the outcome of the Mon-Santilla´n reform in 1845. This system had two major flaws: its limited
collecting capacity and its inability to follow GDP growth (see Fuentes Quintana 1990, pp. 4-47,
Estape´ 2001 and Artola 1986). A good summary of the Spanish fiscal history in the 19th century can
be found in Comı´n (2010).
16 DSCC (12, Appendix, pp. 40-41). Regarding generality, the personal tax set up some
exceptions, a fact that would bring Figuerola much criticism.
17 DSCC (105, pp. 2883-2884).
18 DSCC (12, Appendix, pp. 40-41).
19 DSCC (23, pp. 414-415; 105, pp. 2883-2884). Figuerola announced in the Chamber that the
revenues supplied by the personal tax would allow the abolition of the public monopoly of salt in the
following fiscal year.
20 DSCC (12, Appendix, p. 40).
21 Figuerola even asserted that British income tax suffered from infinitely larger flaws than
his personal tax, but that they had been overcome thanks to this excellent fiscal culture DSCC (23,
pp. 414-415).
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has been carried out slowly, steadily, and in order to do so a special
contribution was established, the income tax»22.
3. THE PERSONAL TAX DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT
Despite Figuerola’s efforts to publicise the advantages of his project, and
his pledge to eliminate its possible flaws, the new personal tax was not
welcomed, mostly because public opinion had assumed that the abolition of
consumption taxes would not be offset by a new levy. The new personal tax
had been enforced since the end of 1868 by the provisional government
decree, but it had to be sanctioned by the new Constituent Assembly formed
after the elections in January 1869, in which the coalition of parties sup-
porting the government held a majority23. Despite the fact that the new
personal tax meant quite a modest fraction of public revenues, it turned out
to be a very controversial matter. According to the parliamentary procedures,
prior to the debate in the general assembly, every item in the budget project
had to be examined by the parliamentary Commission of Public Budget and
Sub-Commission of Public Revenues, in charge of issuing a report, which
would later be discussed and voted in the assembly. Virtually all MPs
specializing in political economy formed part of the commissions.
There are no records of the debates in these commissions; however, it is
possible to infer that they were tough. Figuerola (not a member of the
commissions himself) felt constrained to take part in the meetings in order to
influence commissioners to pass his project. After deliberation, the Budget
Commission decided to introduce some substantial amendments in Figuerola’s
tax24: The personal tax survived, but it had suffered fundamental changes. It
had in fact become a pure direct tax on personal income. As in Figuerola’s
scheme, every citizen over 14 years of age was liable to the tax. The settle-
ment of the tax burden would be made in proportion to the income of every
individual, assessed through taxpayers’ individual statements of income25.
The Administration would survey individual tax returns and taxpayers would
22 DSCC (105, p. 2887).
23 The outcome of the 1869 elections was as follows: Progressive Party, 160 seats; Unio´n Liberal,
80; Democratic Party, 40; Republicans, 85; Absolutists, 20; others, 11. The provisional government
was formed by members of the Progressive Party and the Unio´n Liberal. Together with the demo-
crats, these three groups formed the parliamentarian majority that backed the government.
24 On the debates of the commissions, see San Julia´n (2008, pp. 100-105).
25 Again, the procedure to calculate the individual tax bill was quite complicated. The gov-
ernment would assign each province its corresponding quota, which would in turn be distributed
among towns by provincial councils. Local councils would allocate the final bills to individual
taxpayers. Councils might impose surcharges on the tax bill in order to obtain revenues to finance
their activities. The maximum surcharges allowed were 25 per cent for local authorities, 30 per cent
for provincial governments and another 6 per cent to meet collecting expenses. As in the previous
model, the head of the household was responsible for the payment of the shares of his wife and
progeny (DSCC 104, Appendix 1, p. 10).
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participate in the management of complaints. Theoretically, these bases
rendered the tax much fairer and more precise than Figuerola’s model, but
obviously posed overwhelming difficulties if the tax were to be implemented
in an acceptable and reliable way. Individual statements of wealth were
impossible to check by the scarcely equipped fiscal authorities, leaving much
scope for fiscal fraud. Figuerola’s bases were questionable, but probably
more practicable. According to the report text, the flood of complaints
from local councils made the reform of the income tax absolutely necessary
(this was the only item of the budget in which major changes were intro-
duced, which shows the dissensions within the parliamentary majority).
Figuerola had no alternative but to accept the new bases (he defended
them in the chamber), in order to save the project of setting up an income tax
in Spain.
The ensuing debate in Parliament, therefore, centred on this new income
tax project, although to the primitive tax planned by Figuerola changes were
made constantly. Several features of this debate can be highlighted: Parlia-
mentarian economists shared a common view of fiscal principles, grounded
in economic liberalism, which none of them questioned: minimum state,
budget equilibrium, efficiency and equity in taxation, preference for direct
taxes over indirect, and also the convenience of taxing incomes. As a result,
the discussion lay mostly in the convenience and possibility of implementing
such a tax in Spain. The government faction supported it directly as an
important piece of political economy. The opposition favoured the idea that
principles should be applied only taking into consideration the particular
characteristics of the territory. It was also a debate between long- and short-
term economics. Figuerola justified the income tax (and the entire public
budget) on the basis of a long-term economic reconstruction, which required
new deficits, but would render its outcomes in some years. The opposition’s
only alternative was the immediate restoration of Spanish credit, cutting
expenditure and not increasing taxes in order to balance the budget and
disdaining any long-term economic strategy. Another issue pervaded the
debate (as it did others too): the discussion on the eventual form that the
Spanish state would have after the Revolution, bringing monarchists face to
face with republicans (the latter blamed the Monarchy for the budget deficits
and demanded radical cuts in spending).
MPs who defended the new income tax in the debate (mainly the
spokesmen of the Budget Commission) used Figuerola’s lines of reasoning
already outlined in the decree of 12 October, as they served equally for the
new version of the tax. Some arguments were particularly highlighted. The
idea of income tax as an instrument to foster economic growth was one of
them: Herreros de Tejada, MP of the Escuela economista, stated that the
ultimate goal of the fiscal reforms proposed by the government was to
increase national product and trade, which would render larger public rev-
enues in the long term. Supporting the economistas’ idea that only a liberal
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framework could ensure economic growth, he sustained that liberalism was
the driving force behind the new personal tax26. Liberal economic doctrine
provided powerful arguments to support the income tax; specifically, the idea
that a single tax on incomes was the scientific ideal to build a national
modern taxation system. Many MPs mentioned this idea in the debate (both
to support the income tax project, and also to attack it, invoking its diffi-
culties). Among those who defended the income tax based on this idea, Ruiz
Zorrilla, the Minister of Public Works, stated that the personal income tax
was a genuine attempt to gradually introduce a single tax in Spain, the ideal
of taxation theory27. Herreros de Tejada described the single tax as the
«political economy desideratum», forecasting that, once stabilised and
accepted, the income tax would be the first step towards the transformation
of all taxes into a single tax in Spain. Baeza, MP, also referred to the single
tax as «the beautiful ideal of modern economic science»28. The soundness
of the technical design of the income tax was also invoked. Cancio Villamil,
MP, highlighted the convenience of the bases of the tax: «generality and
proportionality of quota». On the one hand, taxpayers should pay in pro-
portion to their income, and on the other hand, all citizens should pay as
much as they could, in exchange for the services supplied by the state29. The
last main line of reasoning was the British example. Defenders of the income
tax tried to highlight its similarities with the British income tax, which had
become legendary, the balm capable of solving the financial troubles of the
country. Herreros de Tejada believed that the project would have the same
«wonderful» effects that income tax had had in Britain. In spite of the dif-
ferences regarding fiscal culture between the two countries, he claimed:
«What is so good in England, why should it be so bad in Spain?»30. Figuerola
himself also intervened ardently in the debate supporting the new bases of
26 The Commission’s declared aim was «to remove obstacles to production, in order to, instead
of increasing taxes, obtain larger revenues, larger taxable bases, through the development of the
living forces of the country». This is because «the Commission professes liberal principles [y] and,
above all, concerning ideas on public administration, it perfectly agrees with the most radical ones»
(DSCC 110, p. 3146).
27 «I believe that the aspiration of every individual devoted to economic matters is the single tax
[y] the personal tax would be a test of the single tax in our country». In his opinion, all taxes that
Spanish citizens were currently paying could be replaced by the new personal tax, the ideal of
economic scientists. To achieve this target, it was necessary to start gradually, with limited tax rates.
This was Figuerola’s strategy (DSCC 108, pp. 3040-3043).
28 DSCC (110, pp. 3146-3151). During the parliamentary procedure, Baeza changed his vote. He
first voted against Figuerola’s tax in order to open a debate that would reconcile the public’s
complaints «with the principles of the economic science and the doctrines of liberalism proclaimed
by the September revolution» in order to settle the bases of the income tax. He calculated that there
were around three million taxpayers in Spain, and with the personal tax, the figure would rise to
around nine million individuals, which explained the people’s opposition (DSCC 110, p. 3159).
29 DSCC (108, p. 3156). Cancio was adhering to one of Figuerola’s main ideas: everybody should
contribute to the expenses of the state. The idea of generality caused great controversy, for many
MPs, particularly Republicans, did not think that the poor should be subject to taxation.
30 DSCC (108, p. 3150).
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the tax (mentioning its vagueness and forecasting its practical difficulties).
Although he believed his proposal was far better, at least the new income tax
preserved the essential principles of generality and personalisation, in his
opinion crucial in the fiscal modernisation of Spain31.
The MPs who opposed the new tax started by questioning its legitimacy.
Consumption taxes had been abolished during the Revolution and should not
be replaced with any other tax. Besides, the income tax was the consequence
of an excess in public expenditure, inherited from pre-revolutionary cabinets,
which the provisional government had not been able to cut. Focusing on the
income tax itself, they did not question its theoretical soundness: most, if not
all, opposition MPs acknowledged that a single tax on personal incomes was
the scientific ideal expressed by classical liberal authors. However, they saw
it as a chimera, impossible to establish in Spain. Republican MP Tutau, the
most highly qualified economist in the opposition, supported the need for an
income tax in Spain, but disagreed with the bases of the projected income
tax. He foresaw the immense difficulties the administration would have in
collecting the tax and was very pessimistic about its success32. Herrero, MP,
a dissident member of the majority and one of the strictest opponents of the
new tax, believed that the ideal of taxation theory was the single tax, be it on
capital or on income, but tax fraud and the lack of resources of the fiscal
administration to control individual assessments meant that it was not
advisable for Spain33. Time would prove both MPs right. A major argument
against the new tax was to underline its differences with the British income
tax. Its performance was quite well known by some of the MPs, British fiscal
organisation was praised as the most modern in Europe, and the tax culture
of British citizens was admired. All this, some MPs assured, meant that it was
impossible for a similar income tax to succeed in Spain, or at least to attain
the positive effects it had had on British economic growth. Republican MPs
especially pointed out their differences in fairness: Orense, MP, claimed that
there was no tax threshold for low incomes in the Spanish project and the
method of allocation through quotas prevented real proportionality. Garrido,
31 Regarding its application, he acknowledged that the system for setting the individual
liabilities in the new bases was similar to the British income tax. In any case, Figuerola maintained
that the original bases of his project were easier to manage than the new ones proposed by the
Commission (DSCC 110, pp. 3161-3162). In fact, opposition in Parliament attacked Figuerola’s tax
questioning its appropriateness, fairness and legitimacy. Besides, the new tax was criticised because
of its impracticability.
32 Tutau believed that the income tax bases should be wider, also taxing yields from public
bonds and public officials’ earnings. He considered that the true idea of the income tax was adopted
in Figuerola’s first tax proposal, not in the Commission’s version (DSCC 108, pp. 3033-3038). Tutau
defended a decentralised tax system in which the revenues of the state were only customs duties and
the income tax (DSCC 105, p. 2868). One of his arguments in favour of the income tax was that in
Austria, where a tax of this kind had been set up, public debt bonds had increased their price (DSCC
105, p. 2871).
33 DSCC (107, pp. 2997-3003).
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MP, a socialist republican, also insisted on the issue of the threshold:
the income tax should be paid only by those able to contribute, as was the
case in Britain34. However, the main criticism came on the issue of technical
differences: Tutau, despite being an admirer of the British income tax, voted
against the personal tax because he believed that the project had numerous
flaws when compared to its British model35. The issue of the individual
assessment of income that was apparently working well in Britain was the
most controversial basis of the new income tax project. The risk of massive
fraud, the administrative impossibility to check taxpayers’ returns and the
lack of reliable data on national taxable bases seemed to be insuperable
problems.
What was the degree of expertise in political economy of the MPs taking
part in the debate on the personal tax? Following their interventions in
Parliament, it seems that they had sound knowledge of economic principles
(in the framework of classical liberal paradigm), and of the fiscal policies
developed by more advanced European countries. Active participation in
the income tax debate required at least a minimum qualification in fiscal
issues, for the discussion sometimes involved technical aspects that, if not of
great difficulty, required some familiarity with taxation questions. Naturally,
the economic substance of their interventions varied; some MPs made
remarks of a political, even demagogic, nature, whereas others showed fiscal
competence. No doubt, some doctrinal statements in the debate were merely
instrumental. The discussion on who can be considered a parliamentarian
economist in the liberal age is open. Augello and Guidi (2003, pp. xxii-xxvii)
have adopted two objective criteria issued by Fetter (1980, pp. 12-13), namely
«profession» and «authorship», adding three more subjective criteria:
self-consciousness, behaviour in parliament and public recognition of the
status of economist. Following these criteria, the list of Spanish MPs with a
significant degree of expertise in political economy at that time could per-
haps include around fifteen names, a circumstance that would not be mat-
ched in the rest of the liberal age36. The expertise of some MPs is indubitable;
this was the case of economic professors (Figuerola, Moret, Rodrı´guez
and Echegaray), or civil servants with major experience in economic posts.
The competence of others probably demands more in-depth assessment,
34 DSCC (110, pp. 3139-3146). Garrido believed that the issue of the personal tax was a «purely
political issue; not a purely economic issue: A new tax is a very difficult issue that leads to contempt
and protest, and a new tax discredited governments» (DSCC 110, pp. 3154-3156).
35 DSCC (108, p. 3034). It seems that Tutau’s vote was mostly influenced by the Republican
Party.
36 Following Augello and Guidi, it is possible to consider as parliamentarian economists at least
Figuerola, Rodrı´guez, Echegaray, Moret, Herreros de Tejada, Tutau, Cantero, Ardanaz, Ruiz
Go´mez, Capdepo´n, Gimeno Agius, Cancio Villamil, Herrero. Pastor, Sanroma´ and Madrazo, notable
liberal economists, did not take part in the debates, but belonged to the Parliament at that time.
Republicans by Pi i Margall, Orense and Garrido seemed to have had acceptable knowledge of
political economy too.
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although evidence from their background, professional activities and par-
liamentary discourses seems to suggest some competence37.
The position of the majority of these MPs who were economic specia-
lists was to support government policy — therefore the income tax — as an
accurate tool to modernise the Spanish tax system. However, not all of
them backed Figuerola’s original project, as seen in the commissions.
Others maintained a relativist position, accepting the income tax doctrine,
but rejecting it for Spain because of the country’s economic and fiscal
structure (no doubt, their parties’ positions marked the orientation of their
final votes). The tax reform found most support among MPs who were
members and sympathisers of the Economist School. Three of its most
renowned representatives, Echegaray, Moret and Rodrı´guez, addressed a
document to the Chamber contending that one of the keys for the eco-
nomic regeneration of Spain was an increase in public revenues, which
demanded taxing sources of incomes that had so far remained untaxed,
especially yields on financial assets. In their opinion, this called for a
general income tax in Spain, following the British income tax38. As pre-
viously mentioned, behind Figuerola’s plan to reform the tax structure,
there was an enthusiastic confidence in political economy as a science of
government. The economistas were very keen, profiting from the opportu-
nity furnished by the new Parliament, to put across their doctrines and
faith in economic science. Figuerola, in the tax decree, had stated that the
characteristics of his personal tax fitted well with the new era opened by
the Revolution: the era in which scientific political economy, rather than
arbitrariness, should rule national finance39. In the debate, Ruiz Go´mez,
MP, from Figuerola’s team in the Ministry, also stated that the science of
public finance should guide the fiscal system of the country40. Echegaray,
Moret and Rodrı´guez, in the aforementioned document, also proclaimed
an outstanding optimism in economic liberalism and parliamentary
democracy as key factors for Spain’s economic progress: «Spain will prove
37 Data on many of these MPs are scarce. Gimeno, Ruiz Go´mez, Capdepo´n and Cancio had
occupied several posts as secretaries and sub-secretaries in the Finance Ministry. Cantero was the
former governor of the Bank of Spain. Ardanaz and Tutau would become finance ministers in 1869
and 1873, respectively. Herreros de Tejada took mercantile studies and was the secretary of the
Asociacio´n para la Reforma del Arancel de Aduanas (see Llanta 1869).
38 DSCC (105, Appendix 1, pp. 1-3). This document, which is a dissenting vote issued after the
Budget Commission passed the new bases of the income tax, is odd. In it, these MPs suggested that
the government should devise a new tax capable of collecting at least half of the budget deficit
predicted. They were probably referring to an income tax of a much larger scope than the projected
tax. However, according to the Commission’s records, it seems that Moret played a major role in the
drafting of the Commission’s new bases of the personal tax (Archivo Congreso Diputados, Serie
General, leg. 144, n.2, pp. 12-13).
39 DSCC (12, Appendix, p. 41).
40 Ruiz Go´mez regretted that Spanish universities were not used to teaching the science of
taxation, «the good application of public incomes, making public expenditure productive», which
guided the fiscal systems of the most advanced countries (DSCC 105, pp. 2859-2860).
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that freedom and individual initiative are the only true origin of wealth,
morality and progress»41.
The personal tax debate was the longest on economic matters that the
Constituent Assembly held in 1869. Eventually, and despite last minute
movements of the opposition trying to block the final vote, the personal
tax with the new bases of the Budget Commission was passed42. However,
those who forecasted difficulties for the income tax in Spain were right; the
revenues it supplied quickly fell and it was suppressed as early as 1870.
Eventually, the consumption tax had to be restored, first in order to finance
the local and provincial councils, and then as a revenue for the National
Treasury in 1874.
4. INFLUENCES ON ECONOMISTS IN THE INCOME TAX DEBATE
All MPs taking part in the debate on income tax shared the common
economic thought framework of classical liberalism, differences lying only in
their degree of attachment to this body of ideas. The majority of classical
economists dealt with the problem of taxation, although their judgements on
the ideal tax structure were much less unified than on other matters. Many of
them made statements on the hypothetical ideal taxation system and its
characteristics only to acknowledge that, in the end, fiscal policy should be
built on feasible taxes depending on national economic structures and fiscal
traditions. Spanish contemporaneous economic writers were not an excep-
tion; their works explained the ideal characteristics of a nation’s fiscal
organisation (nearly all of them following Smith’s fiscal principles) and then
considered their applicability to Spanish circumstances. There are no direct
quotations from the debate, but the ideas that appeared in Parliament can be
found in the authors of the 19th century Spanish liberal tradition: Flo´rez
Estrada, Jaumeandreu, Canga Argu¨elles, Pastor, Colmeiro, etc. Some MPs
(particularly the economistas) knew the main liberal economic works,
through direct readings (mostly French works), translations or journals such
as the Journal des e´conomistes. As for other MPs in the debate, it is safe to say
that they would have known at least the main Spanish economic works of the
19th century.
Both sides in the debate had plenty of sources to sustain their respective
positions; they could even resort to the same authors to defend and attack the
41 DSCC (105, Appendix 1, pp. 1-3). However, it is important to remark that the economistas’
main battlefield was the question of customs duties. Rodrı´guez was probably the most combative
economista in Parliament and the closest to theoretical reasoning. He supported Figuerola in his
reform strategy, although he desired broader measures for trade liberalisation. In fact, this matter
opened a fissure among membership of the Escuela economista (see DSCC 105, p. 2877).
42 The outcome of the poll was ninety-one votes for and fifty-six against (DSCC 110,
pp. 3165-3168).
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income tax. MPs supporting the income tax (once again especially sym-
pathisers of the Escuela economista) defended the position that liberal
principles were the driving force behind the income tax and the basis
of a modern tax system. The idea that a sound fiscal system should tax
personal income appeared in works by Flo´rez Estrada (1828, pp. 304-314),
Canga Argu¨elles (1833, pp. 48-52), Jaumeandreu (1816, pp. 297-301), Del
Valle (1842, p. 493), Lo´pez Narva´ez (1856, pp. 50-54), and Pastor (1856, I,
pp. 220-225; II, pp. 2-15). However, some of these authors considered this to
be theoretically desirable but unfeasible in practice. MPs who were detractors
of the income tax did not deny its suitability and soundness, but put forward
applied fiscal literature to discard its establishment in Spain. In this regard,
they also had a good amount of credited economic works to sustain their
positions. Leaving aside the idea of restraint in public expenditure, a precept
accepted by all liberal authors, the lines of reasoning these MPs used matched
the fiscal thought of many Spanish authors, who supported the doctrine of the
income tax but believed that it was very difficult to establish in Spain: Alcala´
Galiano, for instance, highlighted the difficulty of ascertaining individuals’
income. Flo´rez Estrada stated that a single tax on income would be the ideal
tax; however, the lack of reliable information on income made it unfeasible.
An efficient taxation system should include a variety of taxes. Colmeiro shared
the opinion that the problem was assessing individual wealth, which had to be
done either through imperfect systems or inquisitorial enquiries. Domenech
also believed that the impossibility of assessing income rendered it imprac-
ticable to set up a single tax on net income, the scientific ideal. Toledano
defended a system consisting of several direct taxes on different sources
of income (Alcala´ Galiano 1788, pp. 66-67; Flo´rez Estrada 1828, pp. 304-314,
331-332; Colmeiro 1873, pp. 464-472; El estudiante de Barcelona 1869,
pp. 235-240; Toledano 1963, pp. 593-594, 600-603)43.
Figuerola’s first project is particularly interesting. Although he claimed
that he was inspired by the British income tax, both taxes were formally quite
different. Nevertheless, Figuerola’s specific proposal had some precedents,
which he probably knew, in that authors were aware that taxing overall
incomes entailed major difficulties. Smith, in the Wealth of Nations, conceived
the capitation tax not as a simple poll tax, but on a more complex basis, as
a levy on all revenues accruing to the individual44. However, assessment
43 Other authors had more peculiar suggestions. For instance, Miranda y Eguı´a (1869, pp. 44-64)
suggested a fiscal system grounded on a direct «real-personal» single tax that would combine two
fiscal bases: the capital (for the real tax) and the individual (for the personal tax). The personal tax
would be a capitation tax with low tax rates. Payment of this tax would confer citizenship rights on
individuals. The idea of linking tax payment to civil rights was supported by Figuerola.
44 Smith’s judgement of this tax was not benevolent. Capitation taxes, when attempts were
made to make them proportional to the fortune or revenue of each contributor, became arbitrary
and uncertain, because an individual’s fortune varied from day to day, and therefore an intolerable
inquisition procedure was required to assess the tax base with accuracy (Smith 1976, pp. 867-869).
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difficulties as well as dislike for indirect taxation seem to have caused him
to support a tax on housing (Shehab 1953, p. 33). In fact, Smith (1976,
pp. 840-842) considered that, concerning expenditure, housing rent was the
best indicator of a taxpayer’s wealth45. In 1778, Britain adopted a tax on
housing rent, taking the annual rent as a manifestation of ability to pay
(instead of the number of windows or hearths). When establishing it, the
difficulties of devising an equitable tax and of ascertaining the individual’s
real ability to pay was admitted. McCulloch (1975, pp. 250-251) also praised
a tax on housing rent, highlighting its advantages in terms of assessment and
the difficulty of tax evasion, whereas J. S. Mill also believed that housing was,
in general, a good indicator of income46. Passy, a disciple of Bastiat, is an
interesting case. He was an enthusiastic supporter of the single income tax,
but, in order to assess net income, he believed that the most secure indicator
was housing rent, as this was an expense that reflected citizens’ wealth and
income accurately (El estudiante de Barcelona 1869, pp. 235-240)47. Some
Spanish authors also recommended a tax on housing rent. Alcala´ Galiano
(1788, pp. 61-62), following Smith, supported a tax on «the rent of the houses
or of any ground» as the most convenient form of tax. Muchada (1847, II,
pp. 13-14), in his 1847 handbook, proposed the replacement of taxes on
consumable commodities with a tax on housing rents in the form of a
capitation that actually resembled Figuerola’s 1868 personal tax scheme
quite closely. Figuerola’s tax was also reminiscent of the Contribution
personelle-mobilie`re, one of the four direct taxes created in France after the
Revolution. It was based on several items, the main one being housing rent.
General and local councils fixed quotas for every town, whereas local
assessors were in charge of allocating the individual tax burden (Schnerb
1973, p. 73; Piketty 2001, p. 235). However, an essential difference was the
generality of Figuerola’s personal tax, one of its key characteristics.
5. THE BRITISH INCOME TAX MODEL
By the time income tax was being debated in Spain, it had already had a
long history in Britain. Many related issues had been discussed and tested
45 The inequality with which it might affect the residents of a house would depend on the
proportion of expenditure individuals assigned to housing rent, higher for the wealthy and lower for
the poor. Smith considered that the tax on housing rent was of the same nature as a tax on any other
sort of consumable commodity, a comparison that frequently appeared in the parliamentary debate.
46 Mill (2000, p. 836) dismissed one core argument against this tax (which was raised in the
1869 debate): the idea that large poor families were likely to rent big houses, this tax being a
regressive tax on poverty. Mill said that in such cases, the tax would act as a luxury tax on pro-
creation, fostering restraint. Nevertheless, he accepted the exemption of a minimum of subsistence.
47 I have not been able to find Passy’s original quotation. In 1901, he published an article
against a synthetic income tax, preferring a diversity of taxes on all single incomes, or a schedule
income tax, like the British one. Passy (1901, pp. 50-53).
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(tax bases, graduation, differentiation of incomes, collecting procedures,
etc.). First instituted in 1799 by Pitt during the Napoleonic Wars, it was
repealed in 1816 and re-established in 1842 by Robert Peel48. The quest for a
durable method of fair allocation of the tax burden is to be found behind
Pitt’s attempt. Income tax would be a crucial feature of Victorian fiscal
constitution, becoming a significant characteristic of British identity and a
mark of the secure relationship between state and individuals, in contrast
with continental states. However, O’Brien (2004: 301) believes that «it found
little enthusiastic support among the classical economists»49. The structure
of the income tax restored by Peel was that devised by Addington in 1803.
Pitt’s previous 1799 model required the assessment of taxpayers’ total
income, which was then taxed as a whole. Addington divided the tax into five
different schedules corresponding to diverse types of income50.
Such a complex structure was not to be found in Figuerola’s project or in
the Budget Commission’s version. Figuerola’s personal tax procedures were
completely different from those of British income tax sharing, at most, two
core features: personalisation and generality. Figuerola designed a tax which
was direct, personal, general, and which was levied on individuals’ incomes
assessed through a simple external indicator that was not difficult to check.
Fairness was one of its problems; it could be regressive for large families with
low incomes. Concerning collection procedures, the system of quotas pre-
vented real proportionality. However, this was probably the only feasible
system as there were no reliable statistics on national, provincial or local
wealth51.The personal tax designed in the Budget Commission was closer to
Pitt’s model, as it taxed individual income as a whole. The taxable base was
personal income assessed through personal declaration after payments cor-
responding to other direct taxes had been deducted52. The quota system to
48 The debate on the assessed taxes at the end of the 18th century is behind the 1799 income tax.
A fiscal system able to provide some equilibrium between taxation on general consumers and well-
off people required the setting up of a new fiscal tool that incorporated direct assessment of income.
Shehab (1953, pp. 35-45). As in the Spanish case, the rigidity of traditional taxes, which were unable
to tax the new activities that economic progress was setting off, was a general concern in Britain.
Daunton (2001, p. 43).
49 There was a broad consensus that this sort of tax was justified only in emergency circum-
stances. It should be proportional, never progressive.
50 This classification of incomes proved very convenient, for the yields showed great
improvement (Daunton 2001, pp. 183-185; Sabine 1966, p. 35). Peel’s old system was a lump-sum
income tax, where each individual had to make a return of his entire income. This system would be
adopted later by some continental states, such as Prussia (Seligman 1913, pp. 485-486).
51 Moreover, the classification of towns according to their population in order to establish the
tax bill regardless of real wealth was unfavourable to poor people living in large towns. As some MPs
argued, Figuerola’s personal tax could be considered not as a capitation tax, but as a tax levied on
residents, for the head of the family was responsible for the payment of the share of all the
household individuals.
52 The word used to define the object of taxation was «haber». Despite its vagueness, I think it
can be assimilated into «income». Nevertheless, the term «haber» was never precisely defined. It
would not include interest returns from public securities, as they had been excluded from taxation
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allocate tax shares subsisted, which in fact cancelled the equality principle.
An interesting feature was that this tax, unlike the British version, made a
rough differentiation between temporary and permanent incomes in the
interest of tax justice53. A feature that both Figuerola’s model and the
Commission’s income tax shared with the British tax was the involvement of
taxpayers in the procedures to solve complaints addressed to the Treasury,
an attempt to «create in our country free peoples’ habits», as the decree of
12 October stated. Regarding the administration of the personal tax, Figuerola’s
expectations that its costs would be much lower than consumption tax were
well grounded; the British example showed that, in the mid-19th century, the
bureaucracy required for income tax had been reduced substantially.
Income tax was eventually accepted in Britain, but not without criticism.
Pitt’s bill faced tough opposition in the Commons, MPs’ complaints being not
very different from what would be heard in the Spanish Parliament 70 years
later. Income tax was established as an emergency measure; hence, once the
war was over, it was difficult to justify its continuity. Peel re-established it in
1842 on a temporary basis, as a tool to fight budget deficit, expecting that it
would foster industry and trade and reduce the cost of living54. However,
criticisms were fierce: radicals and free trade supporters demanded a policy of
retrenchment while they saw the tax as a threat to personal liberty. There were
also advocates of establishing differentiation between the origins of income to
overcome the unfair incidence of the tax. This latter debate lasted until the
1860s so that when Spain began to discuss personal tax, the British model was
not yet fully established. It would not be until the last quarter of the century
that it became consolidated as a permanent element of the fiscal system.
War circumstances in Britain were essential to the introduction of
income tax in 1799. Levi (1988, pp. 137-144) put forward a suggestive theory
that stresses an essential factor that contributed to its establishment: a
widespread «quasi-voluntary compliance» of taxpayers with the income tax,
without which transaction costs of managing the tax would have been too
high. The British government managed to convince citizens that, despite the
(F’note continued)
during the debate. From the description of the bases of the tax, it is possible to infer that it could
refer to other interest returns, salaries, wages and other remuneration for working, allowances and
pensions.
53 Temporary incomes were considered at half their amount when assessing the tax bill. This
allowance was introduced in order to take into account the circumstances of day labourers. Their
precarious situation was denounced by opponents of the personal tax, as they believed that they
would not be able to afford to pay it.
54 According to Daunton, Peel’s manoeuvre aimed more at removing political tensions and
reinforcing the government position than at raising revenues. He tried to maintain a process of
political and social stabilization through a tax system neutral to vested interests and protecting
property. This would be a means to stimulate economic growth. «The income tax was therefore
intended to provide a temporary source of income to cover the transition from a regime of high
duties and low yields to a dynamic economy based on low duties and high yields» (Daunton 2001, p. 80).
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fact that it represented a new burden and a major intrusion into privacy, this
tax was necessary and would be well managed. This would not have been
achieved without a contemporary evolution of representative institutions
and citizens’ control of government. This process took place in the frame-
work of a relatively highly advanced economy with a well-developed and
trained fiscal bureaucracy. In fact, a sound fiscal administration was crucial:
the liberal principle of privacy excluded old inquisitorial proceedings, giving
rise to a taxation system in which the tax burden was assessed through
external indicators. Some of the income schedules allowed tax collection at
source, a procedure that many considered as the key factor for the success of
income tax after its re-introduction in 1842 and a safeguard against fraud.
The rest of the revenue depended on the taxpayer’s tax return and on the
accuracy of control systems55.
Why did income tax not succeed in Spain? Certainly, there was a wide-
spread admiration for the British income tax, and Figuerola’s idea of pro-
moting industrialisation and trade resembled that of Peel in 1842. However,
extensive rejection of the tax, fiscal administration weakness and political
matters contributed to its failure. British «quasi-voluntary compliance» was
absent in the Spanish case. Figuerola’s personal tax was rejected by most of the
population (to whom it was merely a replacement for consumption taxes)56. It
was also rejected by local authorities, unable and unwilling to collect it, as
reports addressed to the Parliament witnessed57 and by the majority of MPs,
who thought its foundations were defective. The Budget Commission’s income
tax bases were too ambitious and exceeded the capabilities of the Spanish
administration, too inefficient and deprived of statistical information for this
tax to succeed58. Moreover, as some MPs underlined, there was no taxpaying
culture in Spain, and fraud was widespread. The defence many MPs made of
this unrealistic project shows ingenuity and doctrinaire positions, with which
Figuerola’s pragmatism clashed. Together with these elements, the political
agenda of the new government was also significant; this may be seen by
comparing the success of the tariffs policy with the failure of income tax. Trade
liberalisation through a reduction in customs duties was a top priority on the
political agenda. This had been the main concern of the Escuela economista
during the previous years and was continuously present in public debate.
Despite opposition, this bill was passed without major difficulties, representing
Figuerola’s most important success. A tax on incomes was another of
Figuerola’s targets in fiscal reform; however, this had been included in the
55 Daunton (2001, p. 186) states that in 1855-1856 the tax revenue under schedules A, C and E
was collected at source and represented 63.5 per cent of the net revenue from income tax that year.
56 In fact, one of the main revolutionary mottos was «Down with consumption taxes!»
57 On the difficulties of collecting Figuerola’s tax, see DSCC (26, p. 784). The flood of reports
against it is in DSCC (40, pp. 794-795).
58 Some authors believe that this was one of the key factors behind the failure of Figuerola’s
economic reforms (see Comı´n 1988, p. 591; Martı´n Nin˜o 1972, p. 218).
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agenda after the juntas’ abolition of consumption taxes. It also then became a
policy priority because its revenues were indispensable for the Treasury.
Contrary to tariff reform, there had been no previous process of debate and
diffusion of its advantages to public opinion, which meant that it was hard to
understand and difficult to accept. In any case, Figuerola became personally
involved with the income tax. At the beginning of the debate, he declared that
he linked his continuance in the cabinet to Parliament’s passing of the personal
tax bill (he had done the same only concerning the tariff reform)59. Figuerola’s
model of income tax might have had a chance of success but the tax on
incomes finally passed was unfeasible.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Surprisingly, Figuerola’s tax and the Budget Commission’s reformed
version have, in general, been ignored as attempts to set up an income tax in
Spain. Moreover, they seem to have been soon forgotten as contemporary
fiscal handbooks ignored them or simply mentioned them in passing60.
Later, only Ballesteros (1933) and Sarda´ (1944) considered Figuerola’s
project as a precedent of income tax. In general, authors have been quite
unsympathetic, pointing out its flaws61. A recent exception is Comı´n (2010:
230), who accurately noted that this tax was «too advanced for its time»,
stressing that «had it been consolidated, Spain would have pioneered the
establishment of income tax».
Evidence suggests that this was a serious attempt to establish a tax on
income in Spain. Its point of departure was accidental, but Figuerola became
engaged with the introduction of the new personal tax. On the one hand, the
revenues formerly provided by consumption excises were essential (there-
fore, a new tax was needed), but on the other hand, he believed in the long-
term benefits that the introduction and development of a tax on incomes
could bring to the Spanish tax system and the nation’s economy in general.
Figuerola’s economic thought had much to do with this process. His faith in
economic classical liberal principles (shared by the membership of the
59 DSCC (105, p. 2854).
60 Miranda y Eguı´a (1869, p. 143) was the only author to mention Figuerola’s tax briefly, with
quite a critical judgement. He said that it was a capitation tax that was impossible to collect. He did not
mention the Budget Commission tax. Piernas Hurtado (1900-1901, p. 133), in the most praised finance
book of the century, also mentioned Figuerola’s tax as a mixture of poll tax and tenancy tax. He did not
refer to the second version. This seems to prove that the final income tax was hardly relevant.
61 For instance, Artola (1986, p. 329) was extremely critical of Figuerola’s tax. Martı´n Nin˜o
(1972, pp. 212-213) remarked on the inaccuracy of the tax base. It is symptomatic that these
attempts were not even mentioned in the journal De Economı´a’s 1955 special issue on the history of
income tax in Spain. Costas believed that the crucial point was whether it would not have been more
suitable to create new taxes on particular flows of incomes and merge them later in an income tax
(Costas 1988, pp. 76-77).
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Escuela economista, the intellectual elite that was the main force behind the
presence of economic thought in the political sphere), made him argue that
their implementation would foster economic development and lead the
country into the group of advanced European nations. Income tax, the ideal
tax according to liberal political economy, would then be a keystone in the
economic modernisation of the country. The British example showed the
way. In line with his gradualist strategy and forecasting difficulties both of
acquiescence and execution, Figuerola designed an imperfect, but plausible,
income tax grounded on fiscal scientific principles.
Figuerola’s tax raised major concern in Parliament (and also among
economistas), provoking discussions on the form it should take. Eventually,
the Parliamentary Budget Commission reformed its bases and turned it into
a pure income tax, to be debated in the chamber. Two positions confronted
each other. On the one side, income tax supporters defended the govern-
ment’s long-term plan to foster economic development, in which income tax
was an essential part, as the British case had proved. On the other side, the
opposition acknowledged its doctrinal soundness, but considered it impos-
sible to set up in Spain. Their only alternative was cutting expenditure.
Economic ideas played an important role in the debates. Both positions
shared a common background, economic liberalism, whose principles they
appealed to in their discourses. Differences lay in each party’s considerations
about how to apply theory effectively.
The debate showed that a considerable number of MPs had a good degree of
economic competence, displaying their knowledge of economic liberal doc-
trines and policies put into practice in other countries. Economic debates aided
the development of the process of institutionalisation of political economy in
Spain. The expansion of political economy in society was considered (parti-
cularly, but not exclusively, by the economistas) as something to be encouraged,
and Parliament was an instrument in this regard as discussions were widely
publicised. As Ruiz Go´mez, MP, said, complaining that the population should
have a better awareness of economic issues, a deeper implication of MPs in
fiscal debates would foster the spread of knowledge on these matters62.
The government plan to establish an income tax in Spain did not succeed
with several causes interacting in this failure. Most of the population rejected a
tax that came to replace the detested consumption taxes, abolished by the
Revolution. The authorities were also very reluctant to apply the tax and the
eventual bases of the income tax made it almost impossible to control by fiscal
authorities (this leaves the doubt whether Figuerola’s more feasible primitive
bases would have had a better chance). There was also a factor connected to
the political agenda; contrary to tariff reform, income tax rapidly became a
political objective, without previous presentation and discussion in public
opinion, which decreased its likelihood of being accepted.
62 DSCC (105, pp. 2859-2860).
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